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Ultramodern Underground Dallas: 
Vincent Ponte’s Pedestrian-Way as 
Systematic Solution to the Declining 
Downtown
Charissa N. Terranova
Mid last century, North American civil servants and urban 
planners and developers proffered inventive solutions to the 
problem of the declining downtown core. Robert Moses looked 
to super-block development and Title 1 of the US Housing Act 
of 1949 to funnel federal dollars into urban renewal projects 
in New York City. Because it had been successful in the sub-
urbs, Victor Gruen sought retail development in the form 
of downtown shopping centres. The Montreal-based plan-
ner Vincent Ponte focused his attention on the “multi-level 
city centre.” Similar to the solutions proffered by Gruen and 
Moses, Ponte’s multi-level centres were large-scale and multi-
use. However, unlike his colleagues’ tabula rasa interventions, 
Ponte’s multi-level centre was incremental. This essay focuses 
on Ponte’s little-known 1969 multi-level pedestrian-way plan 
for downtown Dallas. I argue that Ponte’s project for the centre 
of Dallas is unique in Ponte’s oeuvre because, departing from 
his own espousal of super-block development, it was not built in 
one fell swoop within a super-block. The multi-level megastruc-
tural pedestrian-way in Dallas was fluid and incremental in its 
original planning and subsequent evolution. It is best un-
derstood according to Ponte’s instrumentalization of systems 
theory.
Au milieu du siècle dernier, les fonctionnaires ainsi que les 
urbanistes et promoteurs d’Amérique du Nord ont présenté 
diverses solutions novatrices en vue de résoudre le déclin du 
centre-ville. Robert Moses s’est tourné vers l’aménagement de 
méga-îlots de même que vers le Titre 1 de la US Housing Act 
de 1949, afin de canaliser des fonds du gouvernement fédéral 
dans des projets de rénovation urbaine à New York. Par suite 
du succès de la formule dans les banlieues, Victor Gruen a visé 
l’essor du secteur de la vente au détail au moyen de la construc-
tion de centres commerciaux au centre-ville. Pour sa part, le 
planificateur montréalais Vincent Ponte a axé ses efforts sur les 
centres de ville aux multiples niveaux. Similaires aux solutions 
offertes par Gruen et Moses, les centres multiniveaux de Ponte 
étaient d’envergure et à usages multiples. Toutefois, contrai-
rement à l’approche de la table rase de ses confrères, le centre 
multiniveau de Ponte était de nature incrémentale. Le présent 
article porte sur un projet peu connu de Ponte, élaboré en 1969, 
pour une voie piétonne multiniveau destinée au centre-ville 
de Dallas. Je soutiens que ce projet est unique dans l’œuvre de 
Ponte en ce qu’il délaisse sa propre notion de méga-îlot et que 
la structure n’a pas été construite en une seule fois. La voie 
piétonne à multiple niveaux à Dallas a bénéficié, dès l’origine, 
d’une conception pour une construction et une évolution par 
étapes. Le projet s’analyse le mieux selon l’instrumentalisation 
qu’a fait Ponte de la théorie des systèmes.
Imaging Dallas: The Legacy of Vincent Ponte’s Plan for a 
Grade-Separated Pedestrian Network in Dallas, Texas
The grade-separated pedestrian network in downtown Dallas 
is a warren of underground tunnels, bridges, and interstitial 
walkthroughs covering thirty-six city blocks.1 A public-private 
venture and accretive effort with its first component opened in 
1965 and last 1986, the downtown pedestrian-way in Dallas is, 
though consistently efficient in providing walkers quick passage 
to lunch or between buildings in a temperate climate, unpredict-
able in aesthetic experience. In wandering through, pedestrians 
experience a mélange of surfaces, volumes, and lighting. The 
walk is a contrapuntal affair. The shops and interior architecture 
along the descent into the system at Pacific Avenue and Ervay 
Streets are new and well maintained. Starbucks, Pizza Hut, and 
local Chinese and Indian restaurants line a well-lit dining area 
with colourful modern furniture. Exit the large, modern, commu-
nal dining area and walk down the tunnel toward Thanksgiving 
Tower, and one passes under harsh fluorescent lighting, be-
fore walls of curving grey panels à la the science fiction movie
Logan’s Run, in front of a lone Indian restaurant with a faux 
red brick facade, through a poorly lit and maintained passage, 
in front of a lone Mexican restaurant with a faux yellow brick 
facade, and up an escalator to the entrance of a derelict tower. 
Continued passage underneath the city requires movement 
above ground through the ghost-like lobby of this abandoned 
building. Walking through the lobby of the thirty-story tower 
designed by Harwood K. Smith & Partners, with Dales Foster 
located at 1600 Pacific Avenue,2 is a surreal and haunting 
experience. The skyscraper was built in 1965, and its original 
tenants were the National Bank of Commerce, Electro-Science 
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Investors, and American Life Insurance Company. Today, it 
is empty and unused. Vestiges of the building’s function as a 
banking and retail centre are evident in the desolate storefront 
spaces in the lobby by which pedestrians pass en route to the 
next underground segment. Dallas pedestrians emerge up from 
the tunnel, pass through its dark, deserted, leaf-strewn lobby, 
and re-enter the underground walkway system by descent 
on an escalator that works intermittently. The escalator takes 
pedestrians down, underneath a striking, large, ocular-shaped 
window that looks onto Pacific Avenue, back into the tunnels 
for fast movement underneath the Central Business District of 
downtown Dallas (see figure 1). 
The underground walkway system in downtown Dallas is one 
of a handful of similar systems built not because of inclement 
weather, as with the Canadian systems in Montreal, Calgary, or 
Toronto, but in order to buoy development in the city’s down-
town business core. As with the walkway systems in cities with 
milder climates, such as Charlotte, Cincinnati, Los Angeles, and 
Portland, the walkway system in Dallas was built to motivate 
economic renewal.3 Though the intention of Dallas planners was 
economic growth, the system has served only to remove pe-
destrian life from streets already challenged by ever-decreasing 
economic livelihood. Like the historic central business districts 
of many cities across North America, pedestrian life in down-
town Dallas has shrunk and been proscribed by the departure 
of residents for life in the suburbs. As experienced underneath 
the city while walking through its tunnels, life in downtown 
Dallas is a midday event. Lunch hour in the underground walk-
way system bristles with activity—people dining, shopping, and 
having their shoes shined. The din of activity expires at around  
2 p.m., after which passage through the underground walkway 
is a silent activity. By 5 p.m. the underground walkway system 
is a ghost town. Planners and pundits who originally envisioned 
the project in the late 1960s would never have predicted the 
anemic life of Dallas’s pedestrian-way today.
Testament to the original vision of renewal, in June 1968 Esquire 
magazine devoted an issue to urban planning in downtown 
Dallas. Referring to one of the most sought after planners of 
the day, the cover read, “Vincent Ponte should have his way 
with Dallas” (figure 2).4 Given the saucy tone of the words on 
the cover, that the urban planner Ponte should “have his way” 
with the city and that he was a very eligible and dapper forty-
seven-year-old bachelor who looked young for his age, it would 
seem that Esquire promised an exposé of one man’s torrid 
affair with a woman named Dallas.5 The Boston-born Ponte 
held an impressive, well-nigh noble pedigree. He attended 
Harvard College and the Harvard Graduate School of Design, 
where he received a master’s in city planning, and had worked 
in the offices of Webb and Knapp and I. M. Pei from 1959 to 
1963.6 If only Ponte would bestow his expertise on that woman 
called Dallas. Alas, the magazine’s intentions were far more 
down-to-earth and pragmatic. Dallas was part of an experiment 
conceived by the renowned designer George Lois and pub-
lisher Arnold Gingrich of Esquire.7 It was an “urban project” in 
Figure 1 : A large ocular-shaped window that pedestrians cross while tak-
ing the escalator down towards Dallas’s underground walkway system.
Figure 2:  The June 1968 cover of Esquire.
A
uthor
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publishing and journalism: one of six different covers the maga-
zine ran that month, each of which devoted a two-page spread 
to a given city. With the exception of Los Angeles, Chicago, and 
Washington, the cities—Omaha, New Orleans, and Dallas, to 
round out the six—were provincial American urban hubs. In two 
pages, the magazine promised to analyze the problems of each 
city. In an article titled “Dallas Is in Exile,” the publishers wrote 
that Dallas’s main problem was overcoming the stigma of “being 
a town where a President of the United States was shot to 
death.”8 While Dallas shared its urban ignominy with Washington 
and Buffalo, it was the only city to have “emerged with the killing 
as part of its permanent image.”9 To ameliorate the city’s tar-
nished reputation, Gingrich propounded urban transformation 
through entertainment and education, calling for a major-league 
baseball team cooperatively owned by Dallas and Fort Worth, a 
city of the arts, and an education centre.10 The city also needed 
sleek streamlining and modernization, and for this they called 
upon the skills and insights of Ponte.
Planner Ponte sought to reconfigure the city’s “image,” moving it 
away from the violence of assassination to the sleek futurism of 
modern functionalism. Much more than its skyline, the image of 
the city for Ponte was bound up with its workings as a mechani-
cal system, or an “urban organism.”11 Dallas’s image was funda-
mentally connected with the city as a place of action and event, 
function and performance, and unfortunately as such, its role 
as the mise en scène for the trauma of public murder. Colliding 
performative event into performative event, offsetting the public 
execution of a beloved president with pragmatic planning, Ponte 
counteracted the bad ethos of the Kennedy assassination by 
transforming the city’s function—by focusing his attentions on 
the central business district, eliminating some of the unneeded 
parking lots and relocating much of the remaining below ground, 
adding green space, and developing an efficient above-, at-, 
and below-grade pedestrian walkway system.12 In several small 
plans and perspective drawings, Ponte’s plan projected renewal 
in “an action core of 200–300 acres” (see figure 3).13 The scale 
of the commercial nucleus was, and had always been as far 
as Ponte was concerned, developed around Homo ambulens,
humans that walk: “In Dallas, as elsewhere, one can walk any-
where within [the core] in fifteen minutes.”14 A year earlier, Ponte 
had laid out his prescriptions for urban improvement in the 
“underground city” he was developing at the time in downtown 
Montreal. Once again reinforcing the importance of the cen-
tral business district at a time when businesses and residents 
were leaving downtown for the promise of a halcyon existence 
in the suburbs, Ponte told the New York Times reporter Glenn 
Fowler, “Business cannot abandon downtown. Power, money 
and enterprise are concentrated there. Downtown is where 
the action is.”15 For Ponte, an underground system downtown—
parking garages, tunnels for trucks, and walkways replete with 
storefronts—would solve the problem of congestion in the 
main urban centre and thus offer a counterweight to suburban 
growth.
A passionate supporter of the central business core, Ponte 
claimed that “dispersal is decay.”16 Speaking of the perils of a 
decline that was at once cultural and infrastructural, Ponte’s 
warning reflected not so much the fears that were the impetus 
for “white flight” from downtown inner cities—the age, density, 
and diversity of many North American downtowns—but how 
those fears were the very problem of potential urban deterior-
ation, the source of “decay.” For Ponte, the exodus from 
downtown signified the decline not only of a certain notion of 
civilized living but also, and more powerfully felt, a major source 
of revenue for cities. Thus, Ponte was no idealist hard bent on 
saving the core just for the sake of preserving a European-
style walking sanctum. Rather, Ponte believed that downtowns 
functioned financially: they had always been the heart of money 
making. Underscoring that “Ponte is not just a ‘visionary,’” but 
rather “a superbly effective pragmatist,” Peter Blake, editor of 
Architectural Forum, argued that Ponte’s convictions were lim-
ited to three: “a passionate belief in and love of cities,” an under-
standing that “common sense can be applied to make our cities 
function again,” and a certitude “that the political and economic 
powers-that-be in our cities can be persuaded to cooperate 
in their own best self-interest.”17 Ponte’s prescription to better 
downtown was very much rooted in the pragmatics of the mar-
ket. His marketplace ethos paralleled the ruling guidance of Title 
1 of the US Housing Act of 1949, in particular its fundamental 
advocacy of public-private partnerships in the process of slum 
clearance and urban renewal.18 Civil servant and urban impresa-
rio extraordinaire Robert Moses is famous for his acute under-
standing of the workings of Title 1. Once legislation passed in 
1949, Moses harnessed federal funds to remake New York City, 
creating a network of highways and bridges interlaced with new 
Figure 3: Perspective drawings of Vincent Ponte’s plan for a pedestrian walkway system for Dallas’s central business district. 
Source: George Lois, Arnold Gingrich, and Vincent Ponte. “Dallas Is in Exile,” Esquire, June 1968, 68–69.
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islands of public works, such as public pools and quasi-public 
housing. Moses avidly located “blighted” space for the creative 
destruction of old New York, using federal dollars as incentive to 
private developers, such as the famous projects Moses realized 
in Manhattan with MetLife, Stuyvesant Town, and Peter Cooper 
Village, to create a new New York. With regards to Ponte, Blake 
spoke of “self-interest,” for Ponte’s plans were often built on an 
economic foundation heavily weighted toward the private realm. 
Ponte explained,
Our problem, in terms of planning, politics and real estate reali-
ties, is to find ways of inserting and grafting new levels of circula-
tion into the old city core without inflicting massive damage on 
existing investments . . . of achieving these goals as much as 
possible through private investment without digging too often 
into the already slender municipal purse.19
As Ponte intended, the majority of funding for the Dallas 
pedestrian-way has always been private. Corporations own-
ing buildings above ground are responsible for maintaining the 
spaces in the pedestrian-way below ground.
A kaleidoscopic concept of function dominated Ponte’s ap-
proach to the multi-level city. Economics, the careful and neces-
sary coupling of public and private monies, architecture, and 
planning were equal parts functional. Financing was as infra-
structural as the hardware of construction itself. He saw the con-
fusion of mixed-use causeways, streets where cars, trucks, and 
people vie for the same space, as a major source of congestion 
in downtowns. He turned to the modern precepts of zoning that 
came to fruition in the early twentieth-century planning offices of 
New York City and the carefully calibrated channelling of urban 
movement propounded by Le Corbusier’s Athens Charter. Ponte 
called for the separation of traffic conduits, which would require 
“the use of underground space as well as the separation of vari-
ous kinds of traffic above the ground.”20
Called the “multilevel man”’ by Time magazine, Ponte put his 
planning advice for Dallas into practice at the end of the dec-
ade.21 On 15 August 1969, urban planner Ponte, with consulta-
tion from the traffic engineer Warren Travers, presented a new 
plan for the central business district of Dallas to Mayor Erik 
Jonsson. The primary force of the proposed plan for Dallas was 
traffic management. Properly orchestrating the mobile vectors 
of the city—cars, trucks, and pedestrians alike—was the key to 
a better central business district in the city. Ponte and Travers 
wrote,
Our studies for the future growth of the Central Business District 
aim at preserving and fostering . . . virtues, tangible and intangi-
ble, and lightening and removing the impediments that hamper 
their full expression. Chief among these impediments, of course, 
is congestion. The planning principle which underlies the orderly 
and reasonable reorganization of the city center involves sepa-
rating cars and pedestrians onto different levels—the so-called 
multi-level city.22
No mere plan for beautification, the proposal called to dig deep 
into the entrails of the city and create and connect elegant 
green spaces, vistas, and passageways for trucks, cars, and 
pedestrians. The new thoroughfares would weave together, cre-
ating a filtration matrix not unlike the body’s lymphatic system. 
The plan included long, carefully rendered sectional drawings of 
the north-south and east-west axes of the walkway that unfold 
length-wise from the bound plan. They proposed pedestrian-
ways that passed rhythmically above and below ground, 
through already existing and future buildings and plazas on 
the ground level in order to connect over 100 acres of the core. 
Although the plan may have seemed totalizing with its goal to 
encompass and connect three anchors of the city—Main Place, 
City Hall, and Southland Center (today the Marriot)—the plan-
ners articulated its long-term and accretive nature: “Elements 
of a future pedestrian network can therefore be incorporated 
piecemeal into new buildings as they go up, and then gradually 
hooked up together” (figure 4).23 And, as stated above, fund-
ing for the pedestrian-way would come from public and private 
coffers, with the majority of it funded by the private offices that 
owned the rights to the space above and below ground. Public 
funding would be limited to coverage of the development and 
construction of intersections.
Much of the funding for the realization of Montreal’s “under-
ground city,” Ponte’s most famous and successful multi-level 
Figure 4: Vincent Ponte and Warren Travers’s proposal for Dallas’s central 
business district core showing the weaving of thoroughfares, 1969.
Source: Vincent Ponte and Warren Travers, Dallas Central Business 
District: A Report Prepared for the City of Dallas by Ponte-Travers 
Associates Planning & Traffic Consultants, 15 August 1969, 6, box 11, cbd, 
Dallas Municipal Archives.
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downtown core project, similarly came from private funding—in 
this instance, the investment monies of visionary, Moses-esque 
William Zeckendorf. As Blake explained, “Montreal was the ideal 
testing ground for Ponte’s conviction that existing political and 
economic potentates could be talked into restructuring cit-
ies.”24 A project that originated in 1957 with the advent of a plan 
proposed by the developer Zeckendorf, Ponte’s development 
underground around Place Ville Marie succeeded because 
of a well-oiled machine of participants: an “effective” mayor, 
Jean Drapeau, an inspired entrepreneur, Bill Zeckendorf, and 
Zeckendorf’s architect I. M. Pei, who “had the sense to give 
Ponte his chance by making Zeckendorf’s Place Ville Marie not 
an isolated project, but, rather, the germ of what would become 
a germinating idea—a spreading urban system.”25 The Montreal 
project unfolded under the aegis of the private developer 
Zeckendorf and in the high modern space of the super-block.26
With assurance and poise, Ponte wrote in reference to the 
Montreal project, “As we all know, the best results in downtown 
renewal are achieved through superblock development.”27
Though it goes unnamed, the super-block was a principle within 
a concise list of requisite conditions for fixing the problems of 
the downtown core. Ponte’s list included
1. Existence of large land areas centrally located and under 
single ownership
2. Contiguity of several such land areas
3. Cooperation between public and private interests28
As with most super-block development, the Montreal project 
required the existence of one large, contiguous space, which 
would be carved from the confines of a patchwork of existing 
buildings and throughways. The space that Ponte referred to 
as “destined to be the new core of Montreal” lay dormant in the 
form of a vast, open gulch for three decades. In the 1920s, the 
twenty-two-acre area was owned by the Canadian National 
Railways (CNR). Sir Henry Thornton, the first president of the 
railway, proposed a master plan that included several enormous 
ten-story office buildings that would cover the block. The plan 
went unrealized, leaving a gaping hole in the centre of Montreal, 
until the city widened Dorchester Boulevard in 1954 and, fol-
lowing this intervention, Donald Gordon, the recently retired 
president of the CNR, put forth the plan to build the 1,200-
room Queen Elizabeth Hotel fronting the new boulevard. As the 
hotel was being built, Gordon brought in the private developer 
Zeckendorf who, in 1957, proposed a new master plan for the 
three-block area, taking advantage of Gordon’s idea that “prop-
erties should be developed as a unit.”29
If the above-ground centre of Montreal appeared one and 
whole in its super-block unity, the below ground was a complex 
matrix of interlocking passageways for cars, pedestrians, and, 
very quickly in its early unfolding, by 1966, the Metro system. 
Underneath the often-intemperate streets of Montreal lie the 
snaking tunnels of Ponte’s underground urban template, what he 
referred to as the “megastructure-core.”30 In 1970, it connected 
the 200-acre downtown area that centred on Place Ville Marie, 
the architectural complex including a plaza and the cruciform 
skyscraper designed by Cobb and Pei in 1962. In an early 
incarnation, the project included four subway stations located 
at below-grade mezzanines connected by miles of “brightly lit 
pedestrian promenades, lined with 165,000 square feet of lively 
stores and equally lively restaurants, fronting onto sunken courts 
below the plaza level.”31 It was an incomplete and evolving 
“urban organism,” which was incremental in growth, enormous 
in scale, and multi-use in function. Ponte had, in effect, cre-
ated the skeletal armature for a megastructure underneath the 
city, or, in so many words, a city underneath the city. By 1976, 
“Montrealers [were] beat[ing] winter in an underground world.”32
While the project for Place Ville Marie was largely completed in 
1976, extensions to the underground city linking shopping prom-
enades and office buildings were constructed in 1984 and 1992.
Dallas was thus not the first city to host a plan for the rationali-
zation of pedestrian and vehicular circulation. Closer to Dallas, 
the Greater Fort Worth Planning Committee had commissioned 
mall designer and urban planner Victor Gruen to develop a 
plan for the central business district in 1956, the same year that 
Gruen’s first covered mall, Southdale Shopping Center, opened 
in Minneapolis, and of the enactment of the National Interstate 
and Defense Highways Act.33 Similar to Ponte’s plans to come 
in the following decade, Gruen’s plan for Fort Worth channelled 
circulation into a multi-level rubric, with cars and trucks sepa-
rated from pedestrians. Gruen, like Ponte, gave primacy in the 
downtown core to pedestrians, allotting ample space for park-
ing along the edges of the city and developing underground 
parking and an outer highway loop. Gruen explained, “Large 
plazas and squares could be provided where space, until then 
utilized for automotive accessory facilities, became available”34
(figure 5). Gruen’s plan included a belt highway around the 
centre, which channelled would-be pedestrians into six large, 
state-of-the-art parking garages.35 The parking garages were 
equipped with electronic systems identifying available spots 
for entering drivers. As with Ponte’s multi-level centre, Gruen’s 
goal was to eliminate congestion and create the most fluid 
movement of people possible.36 Once their cars were parked, 
citizen-shopper-drivers became citizen-shopper-pedestrians 
who were free to roam the newly refurbished downtown plazas 
and streets of downtown Fort Worth on foot. Gruen’s multi-
level plan to revitalize the downtown core was quite a bit more 
fanciful than Ponte’s. Gruen report on the city for the Fort Worth 
public included stories about the future of Fort Worth told by 
two businessmen and a homemaker. Speaking through a busi-
ness executive’s voice, Gruen described the future of the city. 
It “had grown at an incredible speed.”37 Reminding the execu-
tive of a world’s fair, towers abounded and the city bustled with 
merriment and life.38 Gruen’s “multi levels” included mechanical 
people movers at and below street grade. In a project for East 
Island adjacent to Manhattan, Gruen visualized a pedestrian 
concourse below street level in which people movers were 
located at single-story height within a double-height subterra-
nean space. One drawing shows a cut-away of people sitting in 
booths on a raised conveyor belt within a sky-lit space (figure 6).
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In their designs for the Dallas–Fort Worth Metroplex, Ponte and 
Gruen looked to yet an earlier source for inspiration in the ration-
alization of circulation within cities: Leonardo da Vinci. Indeed 
Leonardo’s drawings became the seed for the multi-level city, 
yet it was the man himself, equal parts scientist and artist, engi-
neer and bon vivant, who became a model for the mid-century 
modern urban planner in North America. Ponte and Gruen both 
found inspiration in Leonardo’s Renaissance drawings of the 
functional city. Ponte describes the uncomplicated elegance of 
a sketch made by Leonardo: “It was simply to put pedestrians 
on a separate level above the traffic, on walkways and plazas 
running uninterruptedly from one end of the town to the other, 
spanning streets with bridges and tunneling through buildings 
with arcades”39 (figure 7). For his book on the survival of city 
centres, Gruen similarly cites Leonardo’s drawings as a muse. 
Gruen discovered them on a boat appropriately named the 
Leonardo da Vinci, where “along the walls of the public rooms 
are exhibited drawings and models of the work of the great 
man for whom this city afloat was named.”40 Finding an incho-
ate functionalist in the Renaissance man par excellence, Gruen 
became mesmerized by Leonardo’s proposal for “cities in which 
human functions are strictly separated from purely utilitarian 
ones, cities in which the basements are used for cars and car-
riages, the ground level reserved for walking only.”41
While Ponte and Gruen were both “downtown men,” that is, 
advocates of the modernization and maintenance of the historic 
cores of North American cities, Ponte did not see the down-
town as an almost interchangeable equal to the suburban node, 
as did Gruen. Ponte insisted on the life of the centre, regard-
less of the ever-growing edges. One might say that both men 
Figure 5: Perspective drawing of Victor Gruen’s multi-level plan for downtown Fort Worth, 1956.
Source: Victor Gruen Associates, A Greater Fort Worth Tomorrow, Greater Fort Worth Planning Committee, 1956.  unpaginated.
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were driven by an idée fixe, Ponte’s an unswerving focus on 
the downtown, while for Gruen it was care and dedication to 
downtown only insomuch as it was related to suburban-style 
retail activity. Gruen thought about the city in a calibrated plural 
form: city nodes. Gruen concentrated the planning and de-
velopment skills he had cultivated over the prior two decades 
building suburban shopping centres on the downtown core of 
Fort Worth. Central to his belief in the suburban shopping cen-
tre was the revitalization of the downtown core. The city centre 
worked in reciprocal relationship with its edges. By expanding 
into the most outer precincts of suburbs, chain department 
stores, once solely rooted in the downtown core, would gain 
financial power in numbers—literally with more stores and more 
profits. And, more importantly, they would counter the decline of 
retail in the core by posing healthy competition. As a result, the 
downtown flagships would learn to modernize and keep up with 
the desires of the most important and growing demography of 
contemporary shoppers, namely consumers in the suburbs.42
The key to the revitalization of Fort Worth’s core was, for Gruen, 
retail. Gruen sought to “remake Fort Worth as a consumer 
mecca.”43 Gruen argued that it was retail activity modelled on 
the goings-on of the dense and urban core prior to white flight. 
Yet in reality his understanding of shopping was formed by his 
singular and unmatched success as suburban mall designer 
and developer. Though it ultimately went unrealized for financial 
reasons, Gruen’s plan for downtown Fort Worth was greeted 
locally and nationally with great praise. Admiration for the plan 
made Fort Worth a celebrity city for a brief time. Regional jour-
nalists lavished praise on Gruen for his challenging and inventive 
project for Fort Worth. The same week Gruen presented the 
plan in Fort Worth, the New Yorker ran an adulatory article on 
Gruen, envisioning similar plans for Manhattan by the architect. 
Suddenly Fort Worth seemed as important as New York city to 
the public, so important in fact that it would guide New York’s 
development, rather than vice versa. The chair of the Fort Worth 
Chamber of Commerce excitedly claimed, “Fort Worth became 
the most famous city in America.”44
The Ultramodern Approach: Systems and 
Megastructures
Gruen and Ponte were modernists practising after the Second 
World War and shared a love of the rational city. However, their 
views on the city centre and, more precisely, centrality, were 
quite different. Both Gruen and Ponte took heed of the crisis 
of the urban centres in North American cities, applying much 
intellectual energy to their preservation. Ponte’s success as 
designer and engineer of multi-level pedestrian-ways in down-
town business cores across North America is testament to his 
singular focus on the historic centre. By contrast, for Gruen 
the historic business core was one nucleus, perhaps the most 
densely populated and built up, in a poly-nucleic network. In 
keeping with his talents as mall designer, developer, and thus 
midwife of suburbanization and urban decentralization, the 
central business centre was but one centre among many within 
the “cellular metropolis of tomorrow.”45 Though Gruen was a 
Figure 6: Victor Gruen’s proposal for a pedestrian concourse below street 
level in which people movers are located at single-story height within a sky-
lit double-height subterranean space.
Source: Victor Gruen. The Heart of Our Cities. The Urban Crisis: Diag-
nosis and Cure, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1964, 220.
Figure 7: Victor Gruen was fascinated by Leonardo da Vinci’s proposal 
for cities in which the basements are used for carriages and the ground level 
reserved for walking. 
Source: Victor Gruen. The Heart of Our Cities. The Urban Crisis: Diag-
nosis and Cure, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1964, 10.
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hearty advocate of the historic downtown, the business core 
would ultimately become one mall among several malls inter-
connected by highways and separated by green space. Ponte’s 
approach, with a more precise focus on downtown, was oddly 
enough more architectural in nature than the method of Gruen, 
the trained architect. As a young man, Ponte tested the waters 
of architecture. Ultimately he became an urban designer and 
not an architect because he was not confident about his skills 
as the latter. In his own words, he did not want “to become 
a second-rate architect.”46 His talents were better executed 
in the larger scale of the urban continuum, as he had been a 
Fulbright Scholar in Rome studying the relationship between 
baroque planning and infinite calculus.47 Uniting architectural 
desires and acumen with large scales, Ponte honed a unique 
skill in the complexity of designing cities within cities—large-
scale and ever-evolving under-, at- and above-ground multi-
use pedestrian-ways. In short, he was good at organizing and 
integrating the spaces of the megastructure. More architectural 
megastructure than node within an ever-sprawling urban matrix, 
the Dallas pedestrian-way qualifies is an example of the then-
emergent architectural type because of its ad hoc development, 
its complexity of programming, and, due to the unified if not 
homogenous quality of land underneath the city, the modular 
and repetitive nature of its accretive growth. It is no surprise that 
the pedestrian-way system would have megastructural qualities, 
for Ponte reached his peak as a designer in the 1960s during 
the years that the late modern architectural type emerged.
Central to several North American urban renewal projects, 
such as Boston’s Government Center, Albany’s Empire State 
Project, and Vancouver’s Law Courts, the high-tech, sometime 
hulking architectural type in fact emerged from Japan. The 
Japanese Metabolist architect Fumihiko Maki coined the word 
megastructure in 1964, defining it as a “large frame in which 
all the functions of a city or part of a city are housed.”48 Just as 
Gruen and Ponte found inspiration for the ultramodern form of 
the multi-level business cores in the past, Maki connected the 
megastructure to the ancient hill towns of Italy. For Maki, places 
such as the Etruscan city on a hill, Orvieto, where citizens 
thousands of years ago burrowed tunnels underneath what 
would over time become the walled centre, seemed an obvious 
prototype for the functionalism on a gargantuan scale offered by 
the megastructure. Yet, as with new multi-level city cores, new 
technology is what made the construction of the megastructure 
possible. Writing in 1976, the architectural critic Reyner Banham 
defined the megastructure in terms of its “unlimited extension.” 
For Banham, the megastructure was a “structural network into 
which smaller structural units can be built—or even ‘plugged-in’ 
or ‘clipped on’ after having been prefabricated elsewhere.”49 The 
megastructure was an architectural type born of modernism 
and its megalomaniacal tendencies: the predisposition of its 
practitioners to functionalism realized on an enormous scale, 
spatial totality, workings that are visionary and, without a doubt, 
technologically avant-garde. Because of their modernism, 
Banham declared the many and varied megastructures dotting 
the world by 1976 to be “dinosaurs of the modern movement.”50
Tweaking Banham’s definition of the megastructure as a 
concatenation and interlocking of prefabricated modules, the 
shape and interconnection of the woven spaces of the Dallas 
pedestrian-way were ready-made, or “prefabricated,” in a 
slightly unconventional way. They were “prefabricated” in-
somuch as they pre-existed in the city, that is, as they were 
dictated by their context. Rather than extraneous identical forms 
that builders would click or fasten into a frame, the components 
of the Dallas pedestrian-way were already extant, formed within 
the mainframe hardware of the city incrementally and in accre-
tive spatial portions that were sometimes alike or sometimes 
different from one another. Thus, what is poignantly unique 
about Ponte’s plan for Dallas, unique both to his own oeuvre 
of urban renewal projects and those of the time, is that it was 
not a large-scale tabula rasa project. It offers a hybrid typologi-
cal example: though influenced by the tabula rasa thinking of 
the super-block in terms of its large scale, it is an enormous 
megastructural project, which unfolded over a period of almost 
twenty-five years and, similar to other megastructures, functions 
as infrastructure channelling pedestrian circulation away from 
vehicular traffic. Going against Ponte’s three-fold prescription 
for urban betterment via the multi-level centre, it did not depend 
on the pre-existence of a super-block, even if influenced by 
the concept in terms of scale. Rather, it was a megastructure 
that would grow virtually ad hoc through time, yet according 
to Ponte’s overarching plan. Its components were reformed, 
transformed, and then fused together by the dictates of the 
Ponte-Travers plan. Central to the function of the megastruc-
ture, hive-like, teaming movement would equally characterize 
the Dallas pedestrian-way. Large in scale and diverse in use, 
megastructures, like multi-level business cores, are intended 
to filter manifold vectors: pedestrians and, in the case of the 
multi-level business core, cars moving through and across a 
built landscape of varying levels. Mobility over inertia inspired 
Ponte and Travers, and urban order was dependent on careful 
direction of traffic: “Orderly growth in modern cities is above all 
a problem of circulation.”51 The Dallas plan came to fruition as 
though an open system constantly in flux. It grew according to 
temporal shifts. As one architect explains, the unique talents 
of Ponte included facility with time: “Most planners work in two 
dimensions only. Vince works in four—width, length, height, and, 
of course, time.”52 Manifesting in a nonlinear temporality, input, 
output, and feedback worked in concert, with input following 
the market, the development of real estate above on the ground 
level, output manifesting in extended walkways at varying 
grades, and feedback circling back in the form of pedestrian 
needs, maintenance, and long-term planning. In keeping with 
a cybernetic paradigm of systems, the influences that shaped 
the Dallas pedestrian-way may be seen as informational—data 
in the form of roving humans, urban space, financing, and the 
materials of construction. Data in this instance materialize as 
tactile bodies and matter rather than numerical charts, statistics, 
and binary code.
By the time Ponte presented the plan to Dallas, he was well 
aware of the influence of systems theory within urban planning. 
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In February 1968, a year before the plan was presented to 
Dallas pundits, Ponte was the fourth speaker in a series of 
public forums on the subject of “The City as a System” that took 
place over several months and were sponsored by the Boston 
Architectural Center. Ponte’s talk on “The Multi-level City Centre” 
focused on his abovementioned convictions: a passion for the 
city, belief in rational urban order, and understanding that a city 
functions best when private coffers are sufficiently tapped.53
Using drawings and photographs to reinforce the sound logic 
of multi-level centres, Ponte reiterated the role Leonardo had 
played in the cultivation of his thinking. More poignant here 
is the inclusion of Ponte in the series of workshops, since his 
views, though highly pragmatic, were overtly rooted in the clas-
sical humanism of urban and architectural history. By contrast, 
the introductory talk given by Donald F. Blumberg, titled “The 
City as System,” was strictly behaviourist in style and meth-
odology. While Blumberg found solutions to urban problems 
in computer software, Ponte took account of urban problems 
by way of unique sets of data points emerging from hands-on 
practice—physical experience, real estate ebbs and flows, the 
fluctuation of car usage, jobs, and population, and trends in 
architectural development.
Then the manager of the Operations Research and Management 
Systems Group of the WOFAC Corporation in New Jersey, 
Blumberg called for planning to return to a more holistic, or 
totalizing, vision of the city through linking the urban subsystems 
of land-use, social-economic, transportation, services, and long-
term planning approaches. Blumberg argued that taking account 
of all of these systems would instil planning with a greater sense 
of urban dynamism. Though it goes unmentioned, uniting such 
subsystems would also provide a means for encompassing 
the ever-sprawling urbanism that had come to characterize the 
decentralized city. Interspersed with flow-charts and diagrams 
of statistical data, Blumberg’s presentation was premised on 
what was then a new way of practicing urban planning through 
the futurology of the computer. For Blumberg, computer-based 
simulation models could more accurately track and predict the 
“dynamically changing structure of the city system.”54
Compared to Blumberg’s vision of the “city as a system,” 
Ponte’s urban system was far more people-based. It was “sys-
tematic” insomuch as we understand the term as an embod-
ied rather than virtual practice.55 People would communicate 
through physical confrontation within the built system designed 
by Ponte and calibrated by Travers:
So the way to revitalize cities is to make communication and 
confrontation possible again. To achieve this, one must create 
new systems of circulation—one must make it possible for peo-
ple to move, effortlessly, from A to B to C—and, in the course of 
this, to encounter all the opportunities which made cities worth 
living in the first place.56
In the deployment of a materialist systems theory, Ponte took 
a stand against the media theorist Marshall McLuhan. Ponte 
did not so much reject McLuhan’s idea that technology has 
become an extension of the human body. Architecture and 
the body for Ponte were, in fact, deeply connected precisely 
in the manner of a McLuhan-esque technological extension. 
Architecture, such as the Dallas pedestrian-way, technologizes 
humans, making life easier and more comfortable and, thus, 
re-inscribing human perception according to, in this instance, 
the enclosed and climate-controlled megastructural spaces 
of Dallas’s newly evolving downtown. Ponte deviated from 
McLuhan’s thinking with respect to urban sprawl: Ponte did not 
agree with the media theorist’s prediction of the imminent arrival 
and ultimate triumph of dispersion. Ponte countered McLuhan. 
“It will be a long time before we reach McLuhan’s urban heave 
. . . if it is heaven.”57 He continued in a pragmatic vein, “there are 
enormous investments, public and private, which are already 
locked into downtown areas for years to come.”58 On the bodily 
front, he added, “There is the human factor too. Despite all the 
advances in transportation and communications, businessman 
still want to meet and deal with each other face to face.”59 For 
Ponte, building and rebuilding a city, at least its core, was a 
financial and social endeavour that occurred over time. Ponte 
calibrated his planning methodology with a keen sense of 
temporality, not only if his incisive understanding of the city as 
a working, changing, and adapting machine, but also as an in-
vestment in the future. He viewed the city in terms of the longue 
durée. Today’s present was yesterday’s future: the downtown 
was built to endure and endures with us today.
The ad hoc nature of the “system” proposed by Ponte and 
Travers for downtown Dallas, that it would grow, change, and 
accommodate the people who used it, lent the plan longevity 
and flexibility, an open-endedness that would carry it into the 
late 1980s. At the inception of the Ponte-Travers plan for Dallas 
in 1969, the planners predicted that the business core would 
grow much larger and, as a result, the problem of congestion 
downtown would grow unabated. In what was ultimately an 
incorrect prognostication, Ponte and Travers claimed,
Virtually all future commercial development [downtown] is going 
to take place, as it has in the past, within the narrow confines of 
the Core. It means by 1980, according to conservative estimates, 
there will be seven million additional square feet of office space 
alone and 40,000 more workers coming and going daily in an 
area that will not become significantly larger than it is right now.
Yet it was a common mistake insomuch as, during the mid-
twentieth century, belief in the future growth of downtown was 
commonly held. In 1956, employment in the central business 
district of Dallas stood at 115,000 and was projected to rise to 
approximately 170,000 by 1980. The actual employment in the 
central business district in 1980 was 128,000.60 Regardless of 
the unforeseen lag in rates of ingress and employment, Ponte 
and Travers’ original 1969 plan was the lodestar for planning pe-
destrian and vehicular movement in the downtown Dallas over 
the next thirty years. A publication internally coalesced in 1975 
by the Department of Urban Planning in Dallas proffered the fur-
ther development of the Ponte-Travers pedestrian-way project. 
In-house planners continued to focus on linking the edges of 
the business core by “at grade pedestrian areas, sub-surface 
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pedestrian areas, elevated pedestrian facilities, and vertical 
movement between levels.”61 Four years later, Ponte presented 
the city with A Report on a Sheltered Pedestrian System in the 
Business Center that projected development of the pedestrian-
way into 1990 and re-inscribed the growth of the downtown 
core along a new axis toward the Central Expressway in the 
northeast quadrant of the city. In 1982, City Manager Charles 
Anderson invited Ponte back to Dallas to update the 1969 plan 
for the pedestrian-way. Working in conjunction with the architect 
Harwood K. Smith, Ponte further propounded growth along 
the new axis. Ponte and Smith set forth the old and new hubs 
unfolding in this direction according to dates: Main Place (1968), 
Thanksgiving Square (1976), Dallas Centre (1979), Tri-Bridge 
Park (1981), Cadillac Fairview (1983), and Lincoln Plaza (1984).62
Whereas, in the original 1969 document, Ponte advocated 
eliminating parking lots and placing most of them below ground 
level, the 1982 plan found the downtown short 14,000 parking 
spaces and in dire need of 30,000 more.63 Ponte also pro-
pounded the need for good design in the second plan for the 
walkway, explaining, “To people passing through, the system 
should offer visual interest and variety at every step.”64
Conclusion: “Second-Story City Syndrome” and 
Aesthetic Judgment
By the end of the 1980s, support for continued development of 
the multi-grade pedestrian walkway waned. It was largely seen 
as a product of modernist megalomania. As part of Downtown 
Dallas 2010: Toward a Visual Master Plan to Guide Development
(1989), the Dallas firm Corgan Associates Architects conducted 
a survey of personal interviews, which found “twenty years of 
past planning policy has removed people from the sidewalks of 
Downtown Dallas and encouraged them to walk in the tunnel 
system below ground to the detriment of street life.”65 In 1991, 
the architecture critic of the Dallas Morning News, David Dillon, 
wrote negatively in response to Ponte’s twenty-two-year-old 
vision of the “city efficient”:
What seemed like progressive planning in the 1960s has be-
come regressive in the 1990s. Instead of the center of civic life, 
downtown has become a collection of discrete worlds, where 
each project looks out for itself and nobody looks out for the 
whole.66
In the new millennium, such sentiment has become all but 
standard. The vox populi has declared the pedestrian-way a fail-
ure. Mayor of Dallas from 2002 to 2007, Laura Miller was quite 
vehement about her dislike of the project:
If I could take a cement mixer and pour cement in and clog up 
the tunnels, I would do it today. It was the worst urban planning 
decision that Dallas has ever made. They thought it was hip and 
groovy to create an underground community, but it was a death 
knell.67
In researching this project outside the documents available in 
the municipal archive, aesthetic judgment has been much easier 
to come by than hard data. When asked for specific informa-
tion concerning the ultimate realization of Ponte’s project—what 
percentage of his original plan was completed—civil servants 
responded often with the subjective information of the project’s 
failure rather than actual data.68 It is logical that Ponte’s plan is 
blamed for removing active life from the street level of the busi-
ness core, for the project overestimated the future congestion 
of downtown Dallas. It is likely that the core of Dallas neither had 
nor would have had in the future enough street activity to create 
congestion at the level Ponte envisioned. Instead of being built 
for actual necessity, hindsight tells us that the pedestrian-way 
was an experimental extravagance—an aesthetic project that 
was functional only insomuch as it used interstitial and leftover 
urban space in an inventive and futurist way. While bestowing 
downtown Dallas with a shiny, modernist image, its ultimate 
reality is one of segregation, or what Terry Jill Lassar describes 
in terms of “second-story city syndrome.”69 From this point of 
view, Dallas’s pedestrian-way did not truly fail, but in keeping 
with William H. Whyte’s ideas about calibrated walkway sys-
tems, it succeeded all too well. In explaining the conundrum of 
downtown walkway systems, Whyte told reporters of the New 
York Times, “The problem is not that they won’t work, but that 
they work too well.”70 Multi-graded walkway systems are, from 
this point of view, too functional. In their hyper-functionality, they 
create an extreme form of stratification in a context better suited 
for mixture, the integration of people from all different races and 
classes. Indeed the downtown pedestrian-way in Dallas function 
superbly well in terms of zoning. It has separated people from 
cars—and people from people as it has taken on second-story 
city syndrome. Second-story city syndrome, Lassar argues, 
furthers the segregation of class and race in the framework of 
downtowns, relegating poor minorities to street levels where 
retail has tended to languish and reserving the walkway system 
for white-collar workers where, as planners once hoped, retail 
establishments were to thrive. In the instance of Dallas, such 
segregation is a problem that ultimately pales when compared 
to the fundamental loss of activity at all levels, for, essentially 
speaking, downtown Dallas suffers from a lack of critical mass. 
Channelling people underground in downtown Dallas creates a 
situation in which the primary activity of streets above ground 
is automotive. Insomuch as streets are defined according to 
people walking along them, the underground walkway system 
virtually destroys street life at grade level.71 In short, Dallas does 
not have the population density downtown to support life above 
and below ground in its Central Business District.
With regard to “aesthetic judgment,” Dallas’s pedestrian-way is 
for the most part clean, often exciting because of its peculiar 
and unforeseen variations, and sometimes beautiful. However, 
in a sunny and warm climate such as Dallas, where extreme 
weather comes only in the form of uncomfortable though easily 
bearable 100-degree heat in the summer, a tunnelling shelter in 
the downtown business core is not needed. If the original plan 
for the Dallas pedestrian-way was rational in design, carefully 
resolved, formally complex, and delightful in its elegant though 
challenging concept, its ultimate realization falls prey to two of 
the four design problems enumerated by walkway expert Kent 
A. Robertson. In a study of the aesthetic impact of the walkway 
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systems in “five cities with over five hundred skywalk users,” 
Robertson found that the four areas of major visual impact were 
“lack of harmonious design with adjoining buildings, inadequa-
cies in system-wide bridge design, negative effects on the 
design at street level, and blocked vistas.”72 The pedestrian-way 
in Dallas suffers from two of these problems. The transition 
between buildings is, in at least half of the system, awkward if 
not alarming because of a lack of light. With respect to retail life 
on the streets of downtown Dallas, the walkway system has had 
negative effects, luring pedestrians away from above-ground 
streets to below-ground passages. Robertson’s study showed 
that, despite the four primary aesthetic drawbacks, 97 per cent 
of the walkway users he interviewed said “they would like more 
skywalks in their downtown.”73 In parallel fashion, the noontime 
air of the Dallas underground walkway system is convivial and 
positive. At the same time, any other hour of the day—before 
and after lunch—the pedestrian entrails beneath the city seem 
a folly, testimony to another era’s visionary solution to a prob-
lem that virtually never was. That Dallas ever truly “needed” a 
pedestrian-way system is questionable here. If the city’s climate 
certainly did not call for it, then its economics did. A better 
solution to the dilemma of economic life downtown would have 
been incentive to keep and lure back middle class residents. 
From this perspective, the pedestrian-way system seems but a 
stopgap measure for a larger, more systematic problem con-
cerning the mixed use of downtown. Pedestrian residents as 
well as pedestrian workers are needed to make a downtown 
work: neither one nor the other, but both at once.
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